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1 Introduction
International mergers increasingly shape the industrial structure of de-
veloped and developing economies alike.1 This is probably a natural
development. At some stage domestic economies of scale are exhausted.
In addition, economic integration means that not only trade but also
the market for corporate control is liberalised. The question remains,
though, if firms also can have strategic reasons for choosing an inter-
national rather than a national merger. The purpose of this paper is
to apply an international oligopoly model to analyse how the interplay
between the labour market and the product market may aﬀect firms’
merger decisions. Could it be that firms merge internationally rather
than nationally to curb the market power of trade unions? If so, will we
observe a higher number of international mergers than would be optimal
seen from a welfare point of view, or perhaps that international mergers
supplant domestic ones to an excessive degree?
To analyse such questions, a natural starting point would be the ex-
isting models on mergers and merger policy in open economies.2 How-
ever, most of the existing literature is about domestic mergers with
spillovers on foreign agents, and often focusing on the interplay between
merger policy and trade policy. In contrast, we focus on firms’ choice be-
tween a domestic and a cross-border merger.3 Horn and Persson (2001a)
suggest that cooperative game theory could be used to pinpoint which
industry structure will materialise when many diﬀerent mergers are pos-
sible. We apply this method to solve for the equilibrium market struc-
ture when we allow for any two-firm merger in a situation with four
firms initially.4 As a robustness check, we also describe two versions of a
1Gugler et al. (2003) identify five great merger waves during the past century
and point out that the fraction of international mergers has steadily increased. As
reported in UNCTAD (2000, 2002), in 1999 the total value of worldwide cross-border
mergers and acquisitions amounted to more than 80 per cent of world FDI flows. In
the same year, the share in all M&A that was cross-border, in value terms, reached
nearly 31 per cent. Furthermore, about 70 per cent of all cross-border M&As are hor-
izontal. In order to give an illustration of the increased importance of transnational
corporations, foreign aﬃliates accounted for about 54 million employees worldwide
in 2001, compared to 24 million in 1990.
2See, e.g., Dixit (1984), Barros and Cabral (1994), Long and Vousden (1995), Head
and Ries (1997), Sørgard (1997), Richardson (1999), Horn and Levinsohn (2001),
Collie (2003) and Neary (2003, 2004).
3Some papers study how firms in one country may access the market in some
other country. Cross-border mergers are studied as one alternative way of access,
with greenfield investment and exports as alternatives. See Norbäck and Persson
(2004), Bjorvatn (2004) and Bertrand (2003).
4Horn and Persson (2001b) apply their own method to an international oligopoly
situation. They show how reduced trade costs influence merger patterns in an inter-
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non-cooperative acquisition game that yield the same prediction about
market structure as the cooperative framework.5
The novel feature of the present work is the focus on the interaction
between market power in the product market and in the labour market.
Already Brander and Spencer (1988), Davidson (1988), Dowrick (1989)
and De Fraja (1993) suggested that oligopoly power in the product mar-
ket might be an important reason why trade unions have the potential
to influence wage setting.6 Empirical studies suggest that mergers in the
product market — which leads to higher concentration — may in fact in-
fluence wages. But the picture is mixed. Some studies find that a merger
leads to higher wages, while others find the opposite result or no eﬀect at
all.7 Unfortunately, there are few theoretical studies that can guide us
on how mergers should be expected to aﬀect wages. The present paper
helps to fill this gap by showing how diﬀerent types of mergers can have
distinctly diﬀerent eﬀect on wages and in turn on profits and welfare.
A core idea in the present paper is that an international merger
can tilt the power balance between employers and workers. We study
an international Cournot oligopoly with two domestic and two foreign
firms, where wages are set by monopoly trade unions. The analysis rests
further on the assumption that it is easier for workers to organise within,
as opposed to across, national borders.8 This notion is most conveniently
implemented by letting trade unions be national by assumption: any
national oligopoly. More precisely, they suggest that lower trade costs tend to favour
international mergers. As will become apparent, this is rather far removed from the
points that are highlighted in the present paper. Lommerud et al. (2004), Straume
(2003), Huck and Konrad (2004), Saggi and Yildiz (2004), Yildiz (2002) and Spearot
(2004) also follow the endogenous merger track in international settings.
5An alternative to the cooperative route is obviously to model acqusitions as
a non-cooperative bidding game. See Kamien and Zang (1990) for one such model.
Theories of sequential mergers, as in Nilssen and Sørgard (1998), also picture mergers
as alternatives to each other.
6For recent work on the eﬀect of globalisation with international unionised
oligopoly, see Naylor (1998), Munch and Skaksen (2002) and Lommerud et al. (2003).
7Brown and Medoﬀ (1988), Cremieux et al. (1996) and Peoples et al. (1993) find
support for a wage cut following a merger, while McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) find
the opposite result. Hekmat (1995) finds no evidence of any link between mergers
and wages, while Gokhale et al. (1995) find no or only a limited evidence of a link
between takeovers and wages. Finally, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) find that mergers
have no eﬀect on employment in the US while it leads to lower employment in Europe,
which might have to do with the degree of pre-merger wage flexibility.
8Formal union cooperation across national borders is indeed very rarely observed.
In a survey Marginson and Shulten (2000) conclude that ‘the development of any pan-
European collective bargaining structures to determine pay and major conditions at
inter-sector, sector and/or multinational company levels remains a distant prospect’.
In addition to historical, institutional and cultural explanations, this is probably also
explained by the relatively high degree of cross-border immobility of labour.
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firm operating in a given economy meets the wage claims of the relevant
national union. As long as there are national unions — or at least that
unions within a nation cooperate more easily than unions in diﬀerent
countries — then an international merger, as opposed to a national one,
will imply that the merged firm meets two uncoordinated unions.
Since we model market power both in the input (labour) and output
market, a merger will change both output prices and wages. A national
merger makes market shares less sensitive to wage changes, which gives
the unions an incentive to raise wages, and more so for the firms not
taking part in the merger. An international merger, on the other hand,
has a distinctly diﬀerent eﬀect on the unions’ wage setting. An interna-
tional merger would imply that the merged firm is served by two diﬀerent
unions, each producing input to one of the merged firm’s two products.
Then the merged firm can partly replace sales of one of its products by
increasing the sales of the other product. Since an international merger
leads to such a flexibility, it triggers increased competition between the
unions. As a result, the unions compete more fiercely on wages.9 We
also allow for the possibility of exogenous merger synergies in the form
of non-labour cost savings for the merger participants. The presence of
such cost savings improves the competitive position of the merged en-
tity, which tends to increase wages for the merger participants and lower
wages for the outside firms. However, due to the eﬀects of diﬀerent
types of merger on union rivalry, wages are always lower for the merger
participants if they merge cross-border rather than domestically.
Since a national merger has a potential ‘raising rivals’ cost’ eﬀect
(when non-labour cost savings are not too large) while an international
merger always leads to lower wages for firms not participating in a
merger, it is a priori not clear what would be the equilibrium mar-
ket structure. It turns out, though, that the stable equilibrium market
structure always implies that the firms merge internationally. This is the
most eﬀective corporate strategy to reduce union rents, thereby leaving
a larger surplus in the downstream market.
There are numerous examples of multinational firms that exploit the
potential for shifting production between plants in diﬀerent countries. In
Marginson and Schulten (1999) it is documented in detail that in such
industries as automobile, electrical consumer products and food man-
ufacturing products the plants within multinational firms are engaged
in internal competition for both current production and future invest-
ments. One example is the German car producer BMW, who acquired
9This could be called a ‘second source’ argument, even though this is not second
sourcing in a literal sense. The paper in the second source literature that is closest
to our model (but still quite diﬀerent) is Choi and Davidson (2004).
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the British company Rover in 1994 (see Hall, 1998). In 1998 BMW
threatened to close down production at the Rover plant. This led to
an agreement where the workers at the Rover plant accepted a package
of measures including the elimination of premium payments for over-
time and Saturday working. Another example is Electrolux, a Swedish
producer of electrical consumer products with plants in many European
countries (see Paparella, 1997). It announced in November 1997 that
it planned to restructure production in Europe and close down some
plants in its subsidiary Zanussi in Italy. In December 1997 Electrolux
and the trade union at Zanussi signed an agreement where it was de-
cided that there would be no plant closures in Italy. The trade union
agreed on a package of measures that included lower wages, for exam-
ple that newly-recruited workers would receive a lower wage than the
minimum level set by company-level bargaining for the first two years.10
Norway’s dominant chocolate producer Freia recently introduced night
shifts, something the union had resisted for decades. Freia is now a sub-
sidiary of the US multinational Kraft Foods. The threat that production
could be moved to some other Kraft subsidiary abroad if productivity
growth targets were not met was enough to convince the union.
Many have the impression that the role of unions is strongly in
decline, which presumably would make a theory of union wage responses
to mergers less interesting. However, international evidence is very
mixed. OECD (1997) report union coverage figures for OECD mem-
ber countries for 1980, 1990 and 1994.11 In 1994 the vast majority of
OECD countries still had union coverage rates above 70%. The relatively
few countries with coverage less than 50% were USA, UK, Canada, New
Zealand and Japan. De-unionisation in the sense of a stark drop in
union coverage over the period is only found in the UK and in New
Zealand. Also in the US coverage is sliding downwards, albeit from a
starting point that was very low to begin with. A couple of countries,
notably Australia and Portugal, have experienced sharp falls in union
membership, but without a corresponding change in union coverage.
Leaving the Anglo-American sphere, in Continental Europe and Scan-
dinavia union coverage is stable and high.12 True, high union coverage
10In a press release the trade union stated that ‘the agreement means most notably
that the Italian Zanussi plants have managed to avoid being on the international list
of cuts decided by Electrolux’ (see Paparella, 1997).
11Union coverage refers to the percentage of workers covered by a collective agree-
ment, as opposed to union density that reports the percentage of workers that are
members of unions. In some countries coverage and density diﬀer substantially, with
France as the famous example. There, in 1994, union coverage was 95% while union
density was 9%.
12EEAG (2004) gives 2001 figures for union coverage for a somewhat diﬀerent set
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does not necessarily mean that unions are as strong as they were. The
theory presented in this paper is precisely a theory of how some mergers
can weaken the position of trade unions and of how firms seek out pre-
cisely those mergers. Note also that a theory of mergers in international
unionised oligopoly can be of interest also for firms that are based in low
union coverage countries. For example, US multinationals will often be
involved in mergers with firms in unionised countries. To calculate the
correct valuation of a possible takeover target in a unionised country a
bidder needs to consider wage responses in the firms in question and in
the rest of the industry.
While firms prefer to merge internationally, it is not obvious that
this is the correct choice from a global or domestic welfare point of
view. A wage reduction is a transfer from workers to employers that by
assumption does not influence social welfare by itself. However, lower
wages may in turn lead to lower product prices. If so, consumers benefit
as well. We find that two international mergers is actually the most
preferred market structure from a global welfare perspective if products
are suﬃciently close substitutes — even if non-labour cost savings are
non-existent — implying that there is a perfect correspondence between
private and social merger incentives in this case. On the other hand, if
products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, there will be an excessive number
of international mergers.
Many would argue that the aim of competition authorities is not to
maximise global social welfare, but rather the domestic social welfare of
one’s own country. A policy maker must then evaluate to what extent
a wage cut in the oligopolised sector is transformed into lower consumer
prices rather than higher profits — and to what extent the relevant con-
sumers and capital owners reside in the country in question. Interna-
tional mergers may not always be wanted — in some cases no merger
is domestic welfare optimal, in other cases the preferred outcome is a
national merger in the foreign country. Our perhaps most interesting re-
sult is that a domestic merger always is detrimental to domestic welfare,
unless non-labour cost savings with respect to a merger are suﬃciently
high. This questions the idea that lax merger policy towards domestic
firms, to build up a national champion, would be a good substitute for
strategic trade policy. Rather, when the non-intervention outcome needs
to be corrected, our analysis points towards strict merger policy both as
pertains domestic and foreign firms as the optimal choice.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
present the structural model and explain the merger formation process.
of countries. The impression is that union coverage remained stable during the latter
half of the 1990s.
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The union wage eﬀects of merger — the crucial feature of the model — are
analysed and discussed in Section 3. The profitability of a single two-
firm merger is briefly discussed in Section 4, followed by a presentation
of the equilibrium market structure in Section 5. Implications for welfare
— global and domestic — are discussed in Sections 6 and 7. In Section
8 we extend the model to allow for non-cooperative merger formation.
Finally, some concluding remarks are oﬀered in Section 9.
2 The model
Four ex ante identical firms (owners) are located in two countries, A
and B. Owners 1 and 2 are located in country A, whereas owners 3
and 4 reside in country B. Each plant produces a specific brand of a
diﬀerentiated product, and firms compete in Cournot fashion in a single
integrated market. We assume that entry to the industry is restricted,
due to some firm-specific ownership advantages of the incumbents.
The market clearing price of brand i is given by the following inverse
demand function:
pi = a− qi − b
X
j
qj, i, j = 1, ...4, i 6= j, (1)
where qi is supplied quantity of brand i, and b ∈ (0, 1) is an inverse
measure of the degree of product diﬀerentiation.13,14 Following Singh and
Vives (1984), this demand structure is derived from the maximisation
problem of a representative consumer whose utility function is given by
U = a
X
i
qi −
1
2
ÃX
i
q2i + 2b
X
i
X
j
qiqj
!
, i, j = 1, ...4; i 6= j. (2)
The goods are produced by using labour and non-labour inputs in a
fixed proportion, where one unit of brand i requires one unit of labour
— at the price wi — and a given amount of non-labour input(s) — at the
price c. We further assume that a firm can reduce its non-labour costs
by merging with another firm. Such exogenous merger synergies are
captured by assuming that marginal production costs for brand i are
given by
wi + c(1−Diµ),
13Only with perfect substitutability can a firm simply move the production of a
brand from one plant to another.
14Lommerud and Sørgard (1997) use a similar demand system, but assume that
there are fixed costs associated with establishing brands and that the number of
brands is an endogenously determined choice variable.
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where
Di =
½
0 if firm i does not participate in a merger
1 if firm i participates in a merger
,
and µ ∈ [0, 1] indicates the magnitude of the cost synergy. We preserve
the ex ante symmetry of the model by assuming that these synergies can
be realised in a merger between any two firms.
Workers are organised in trade unions. A key assumption of the
model is that workers are not able to organise across borders, nor are
trade unions in diﬀerent countries able credibly to coordinate their wage
demands.15 We thus make the assumption that workers are organised in
country-specific industry-wide unions.16 17
We adopt the monopoly union model, where wages in each country
are unilaterally set by the respective trade unions.18 The objective of
each trade union is to maximise total rents for its members19 20, implying
15A model that studies possible collusion among trade unions can be found in
Straume (2002).
16An alternative interpretation of the model is that workers are organised in plant-
specific trade unions that coordinate wage setting within — but not across — national
borders.
17EEAG (2004) documents that the countries in Western Europe that has high
union coverage also typically has wage formation predominantly at the industry level
— or even more centralised. In contrast, the UK and the former-Communist new
entrants to the EU tend to have wage formation predominantly at the enterprise
level. The main mechanism of the model can survive in such a setting, if enterprise
wage formation tends to be coordinated within the firm nationally after a merger, but
not internationally. The details of the model would, however, be somewhat diﬀerent.
18In the no-merger starting point this means that all firms are unionised and all
unions are equally strong. The theory in this paper is not one of capital flight to
non-unionised low-cost countries, but of multinationals playing equally strong unions
out against each other.
19Already Dunlop (1944) noted that an economic theory of trade unions would
have to start with the assumption that unions maximise something. The rent-seeking
assumption is widely used as a simple union maximand. If workers are risk-neutral
it coincides with the idea of a utilitarian union that maximises the weighted sum
of its members’ utilities. See Oswald’s (1985) famous survey for a discussion of
union objectives. Moreover, Pemberton (1988) shows that a rent-maximising union
also is equivalent to a ‘managerial union’ with union leaders who are interested in
size (employment) and union members (represented by the median worker) who are
interested in excess wages, where the leadership and workers have equal bargaining
power.
20An Editor has pointed out that it is important for subsequent results that the
crossderivative of the union maximand as regards wage and employment is not neg-
ative. We know of no example of a union utility function that has been used in theo-
retical or empirical work that opens up the possibility of a negative cross-derivative.
If a union utility function is written down free-hand, of course any sign of the cross-
derivative is possible. But union utility functions are routinely based on some as-
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the following utility functions for the trade unions in countries A and B,
respectively:
VA = (w1 − w)n1 + (w2 − w)n2, (3)
VB = (w3 − w)n3 + (w4 − w)n4, (4)
where wi (ni) is the wage (employment) level at plant i, and w is the out-
side wage (that can be earned outside the oligopoly industry), assumed
to be equal in both countries. Note that each trade union is allowed to
set diﬀerent wages at diﬀerent plants.
Finally, profits associated with the sale of brand i are given by21
πi = [pi − wi − c (1−Diµ)]ni, i = 1, ...4. (5)
The game is characterised by the following sequence of moves:22
• Stage 1: The equilibrium ownership structure of the industry is
determined through bargaining between the owners.
• Stage 2: The trade unions simultaneously and independently set
wages.
• Stage 3: The firms simultaneously and independently set quanti-
ties.
2.1 Merger formation
The ownership structure of the industry is assumed to be formed through
a cooperative game of coalition-formation. Wemake the assumption that
only two-firm mergers are allowed.23 Each production plant continues
to exist after a merger, and it is not possible to move the production of
sumption about how the union utility function came about. Take for example the
idea that the union utility function is a utilitarian welfare function over its mem-
bers’ utilities. Then ’employment’ is not a commodity that yields utility in itself,
but simply the number of people that gets utility from money. This limits what the
above-mentioned cross-derivative can be.
21In order to ensure an interior solution, with non-negative profits for all firms in
every possible market structure, we assume that c < 12 (a− w).
22We implicitly picture that international ’liberalisation’ of the markets just took
place, and that there were pre-liberalisation national bans on merger-to-monopoly.
The starting point then is four independent firms.
23It is straightforward but space-consuming to extend the model to allow for merg-
ers that include three production units. Three-firm mergers are more likely to be
blocked by competition authorites, and the present focus on two-firm mergers also
makes the distinction between national and international merger more succint. The
two-firm mergers assumption also contains an assumption that merger-to-monopoly
is banned.
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one brand from one plant to another, so the quintessence of a merger is
coordination on output decisions among the participating units. With
two-firm mergers, we are left with 6 possible market structures, com-
prising a combined total of 10 possible ownership structures, that could
emerge as an equilibrium outcome. Labelling country A as the ‘domes-
tic’ country, we introduce the following notation to distinguish between
the diﬀerent market structures:
1. No merger: M0 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
2. One domestic (national) merger: MdN = {12, 3, 4}
3. One foreign (national) merger: MfN = {1, 2, 34}
4. Two national mergers: MNN = {12, 34}
5. One international merger: MI = {13, 2, 4}, M 0I = {14, 2, 3}, M 00I =
{1, 23, 4}, M 000I = {1, 24, 3}
6. Two international mergers: MII = {13, 24}, M 0II = {14, 23}
The solution procedure is based on Horn and Persson (2001a), who
treat the merger process as a cooperative game of coalition-formation,
where the players are free to communicate and write binding contracts.
Owners that agree on a merger can decide on any division of the firm’s
profits, but payments between coalitions are not allowed. The approach
then involves a comparison of any two possible ownership structures Mi
and Mj, where Mi is said to dominate Mj if the combined profits of
the decisive group of owners are larger in Mi than in Mj. The decisive
group of owners are the owners that are expected to be able to influence
whether Mi will be formed instead of Mj, and vice versa. Given the
above assumptions, owners belonging to identical coalitions in the two
structures cannot aﬀect whether Mj will be formed instead of Mi, but
all remaining owners can influence this choice and are thus decisive.24
To give a brief illustration of the main ideas in the model, consider a
comparison between the no-merger structure (M0) and the market struc-
ture with one domestic merger (MdN). In this case owners 3 and 4 stand
alone in both structures, so the decisive owners are the merger partici-
pants inMdN , i.e., owners 1 and 2, and dominance relation is determined
by whether or not the merger is profitable for the participants. Now
consider instead a comparison between a domestic and an international
merger, say between MdN and MI . For M
d
N to dominate MI it is not
enough that (the domestic) owners 1 and 2 preferMdN overMI . If owner
24See Horn and Persson (2001a) for a formal definition of decisive owners.
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3 is adversely aﬀected by the formation of MdN , this owner may want
to persuade owner 1 to form MI instead, by oﬀering a large share of
the surplus in this structure. Thus, three owners (1,2 and 3) are deci-
sive, and the dominance relation is determined by a comparison of total
profits for these three owners in the two ownership structures.
Finally, the solution concept is the core. Those structures that are
in the core — i.e., the structures that are undominated — are defined
as Equilibrium Ownership Structures (EOS), which then determine the
Equilibrium Market Structure (EMS).
3 Market structures and union wages
In this Section we present a detailed analysis of union wage responses
to diﬀerent market structures, which to a large extent determines the
outcome of the bargaining game between owners. Due to the symmetric
nature of the model, we can ease notation by introducing the follow-
ing notational shorthand: in market structures that involve one or more
mergers, wkm and w
k
o refer to the equilibrium wage level for a merger par-
ticipant and an outsider, respectively, in market structure Mk. Similar
notation is used for other equilibrium variables throughout the paper.
Variables without subscript refer to the symmetric no-merger equilib-
rium.
Since equilibrium wages depend on the characteristics of the market
structure, a merger yields potentially both exogenous and endogenous
cost synergies. As will be shown below, the wage eﬀects of mergers
are also related the magnitude of non-labour cost savings. However,
for clarity of exposition, we will start out by discussing the case of no
exogenous cost synergies, i.e., µ = 0. By a comparison of equilibrium
wage expressions for diﬀerent market structures, with µ = 0, we derive
the following result:25
Proposition 1 (µ = 0) : wNNm > w
N
o > w
N
m > w
0 > wIo > w
I
m > w
II
m
Without exogenous merger synergies, there exists an unambiguous
ranking of market structures with respect to union wages. Further-
more, using the no-merger structure as a benchmark, a clear pattern
arises: union wages are higher in any market structure involving national
merger(s), whereas the opposite is true in market structures involving
international merger(s).26
25Expressions for equilibrium wages, employment and profits in each market struc-
ture are reported in Appendix A.
26These results are related to Lommerud et al. (2004), who discuss how down-
stream mergers might influence the prices charged by upstream firms with market
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The intuition behind these results can be found through a more care-
ful scrutiny of the unions’ maximisation problem. Consider the first-
order conditions for optimal wage setting by the trade union in country
A, given by
ni (·)+(wi − w) ∂ni (·)∂wi +(wj − w)
∂nj (·)
∂wi
= 0, i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j, (6)
where ni (·) is the derived labour demand at firm i. Obviously, the first-
order conditions for optimal wage setting by the trade union in country
B are completely equivalent.
From (6) we see that the relationship between market structures and
union wages potentially works through two diﬀerent channels. Mergers
aﬀect the wage level at firm i insofar as either the demand for labour
or the wage responsiveness of labour demand (the slope of the labour
demand curve) — evaluated at the pre-merger equilibrium wage level
— changes as a result of the merger. More specifically, a reduction (in-
crease) in labour demand, or more (less) wage responsive labour demand,
induces the trade union to set a lower wage.
For comparative purposes the labour demand of firm i inM0 is given
by
n0i (·) =
(2− b) (a− c)− 2 (1 + b)wi + b
P
j 6=iwj
4 + 4b− 3b2 , i = 1, ...4. (7)
On the other hand, labour demand for merger participants and outside
firms in a market structure with one merger are given by27
nkm (·) =
(2− b) (a− c) + (2 + b)µc− (1+b)(2−b)
(1−b) wm +
2b
(1−b)w−m + b
P
wo
2 (2 + 3b− b2) ,
(8)
nko (·) =
2 (a− c (1 + bµ))− 2(2+2b−b
2)
(2−b) wo +
2b
(2−b)w−o + b
P
wm
2 (2 + 3b− b2) , (9)
power. A trade union can be seen as such an ‘upstream input supplier’. In that
paper we point out that the main results, broadly speaking, carries over to models
with wage bargaining (rather than wage setting) and/or Bertrand competition. Even
though there are diﬀerences between the models — the present one being made specif-
ically to portray an international oligopoly — the main mechanisms of the models are
similar, so we expect this to be true also in this framwork. Our earlier paper has no
mention of welfare analysis, which is of central interest here.
27The pairs of merger participants and outside firms are labelled (m,−m) and
(o,−o), respectively.
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k = N, I. In market structures with two mergers, labour demand for a
merger participant is given by28
nkm (·) =
2 (a− c (1− µ))− (2+b(2−b))
(1−b) wm +
b(2+b)
(1−b) w−m + b
P
wm0
4 (1 + 2b)
, (10)
k = NN, II.
Consider first the wage eﬀects of a national merger. A merger re-
duces the degree of product market competition. With no exogenous
cost synergies, this naturally causes labour demand to fall for the merger
participants. However, reduced product market competition also implies
that the equilibrium market shares of firms are less responsive to wage
changes, which — since each trade union controls both wm and w−m in
market structures with national mergers — translates directly into less
wage responsive labour demand for each trade union. This is easily con-
firmed by a comparison between (7) and (8)-(10). When labour demand
gets less wage responsive, the trade unions respond by increasing wages,
and this eﬀect always dominates the eﬀect of a merger on total labour
demand.29 Naturally, this eﬀect is also stronger in the market structure
with two national mergers.
In the case of just one national merger, Proposition 1 confirms that
wages are lower in the country of the merger participants. This is due
to the eﬀect of the merger on labour demand for the merging and non-
merging firms, respectively. At the pre-merger wages, the merged firm
has an incentive to cut back on production, which implies a reduction
of labour demand. The outside firms — being free-riders on the merger
— have opposite incentives. In fact, comparing (8) and (9) at the no-
merger equilibrium, with µ = 0, we find that nkm =
¡
1− b
2
¢
nko . This
labour demand eﬀect causes wages to be lower for the merged firm, and
the eﬀect is stronger the less diﬀerentiated products are. Consequently,
there is a ’raising rivals’ costs’ eﬀect of a national merger in this case.
Now consider an international merger. The crucial feature of such a
merger is that the merged firm is able to scale up production at one plant
and down at the other, and the two plants involved rely on labour supply
from diﬀerent trade unions. When the trade unions are not able to con-
trol both wm and w−m, this means that labour demand from each plant
of the merged firm gets more responsive to wage diﬀerentials between
the two trade unions. The result is lower wages for the internationally
merged firm. The strength of this eﬀect depends on the substitutabil-
ity of products in demand. The less diﬀerentiated the products are,
28The pairs of merger participants are labelled (m,−m) and (m0,−m0).
29This eﬀect of reduced product market competition on the wage sensitivity of
labour demand is also identified, in a somewhat diﬀerent setting, by Dowrick (1989).
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the more intense is the merger-induced competition between the trade
unions. From (8) we see that limb→1
¡
∂nIm/∂wm
¢
→−∞, implying that
all union rents will be competed away in the merged firms if products
are homogeneous.
In market structures with just one international merger, wages will
also decrease for the outside firms, compared with the case of no merger.
This is a labour demand eﬀect. Since ∂nko/∂wm > 0, lower wages for the
merged firm will reduce labour demand at the non-merged firms. Con-
sequently, the trade unions will respond by lowering wages also for firms
not participating in the merger. Obviously, this eﬀect is also stronger
the less diﬀerentiated products are.
Exogenous merger synergies
How does the presence of exogenous cost synergies influence the wage
eﬀects of mergers? From (8)-(10) we see that non-labour cost synergies
aﬀect total labour demand in an unambiguous manner. More specifically,
we see that
∂nkm (·)
∂µ > 0 and
∂nko (·)
∂µ < 0.
The intuition is relatively straightforward. Non-labour merger synergies
implies a reduction of marginal production costs. Ceteris paribus, the
profit-maximising response by the merged firm is to increase production,
which implies an increase in the demand for labour. In the case of one
merger, the outside firms are aﬀected through the improved competitive
position of the merged firm. Since production quantities are strategic
substitutes, exogenous merger synergies will — ceteris paribus — lead to a
reduction of labour demand for the outside firms. Since µ does not aﬀect
the slope of the labour demand curves, the (partial) eﬀects of non-labour
cost savings on union wages follow immediately: wages increase for the
merger participants and decrease for the outside firms.
When allowing for exogenous merger synergies we can no longer make
an unambiguous ranking of market structure with respect to equilibrium
wages. However, a relatively clear pattern can still be established:
Proposition 2 (i) wNm > wi for all µ ∈ [0, 1] ,
(ii) wi > wIm if µ < µ :=
(4+b)(2−b)b(a−c−w)
8c(1−b)(4−b) ,
(iii) min
©
wNm, w
NN
m
ª
> max
©
wIm, w
II
m
ª
for all µ ∈ [0, 1] .
Parts (i) and (ii) of the Proposition show the wage eﬀect of a na-
tional and an international merger, respectively. A national merger
always leads to increased wages for the merger participants. In fact,
since ∂wkm/∂µ > 0, the presence of non-labour synergies reinforces the
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wage eﬀect already established in Proposition 1. For an international
merger, on the other hand, the opposite holds true. In this case, the
presence of non-labour cost savings introduce two opposing forces on
union wage responses to a merger. An international merger thus leads
to higher wages for the merger participants if non-labour cost savings
are suﬃciently large. Since the union-rivalry eﬀect is increasing in b,
an international merger is more likely to result in higher wages when
products are more diﬀerentiated. Furthermore, a certain degree of prod-
uct diﬀerentiation is necessary for the non-labour cost savings eﬀect to
dominate the union rivalry eﬀect. Indeed, we see that limb→0 µ→ 0 and
limb→1 µ→∞.
Part (iii) of the Proposition contains the most important result of
this Section, though. It confirms that — when comparing market struc-
tures with national and international merger(s) — wages for the merger
participants are always lower when they merge internationally. Both
types of merger may cause wages to rise, but, when compared with
national mergers, the intensified inter-union rivalry brought about by
cross-border mergers always has a dampening eﬀect on wages for the
merger participants.
4 Merger profitability and free-rider eﬀects
Before deriving the equilibrium of the endogenous merger game, it is in-
structive to consider how a merger aﬀects profits for merger participants
and outside firms. In order to place the model in a relevant context,
we can relate our analysis to two basic findings in the existing merger
literature.
First, with exogenous (and linear) production costs we know that a
certain degree of product diﬀerentiation is necessary in order to make
a two-firm merger in Cournot oligopoly profitable (see, e.g., Deneckere
and Davidson, 1985, and Lommerud and Sørgard, 1997). In a Cournot
model, a merger without cost savings will lead the merging parties to con-
tract their output, while outsiders expand. The more diﬀerentiated prod-
ucts are, the less the merged unit loses market share to outsiders, and
for suﬃcient diﬀerentiation a merger is profitable even in the Cournot
case. Second, a purely anti-competitive merger (which yields no cost
synergies) is typically more profitable for firms not participating in the
merger. This free-rider eﬀect is frequently referred to as the ‘merger
paradox’ (see also Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, 1983).
Consider first the eﬀect of a single international merger. Using the
no-merger equilibrium as a benchmark, a straightforward comparison of
equilibrium profits (see Appendix A) produces the following result:
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Figure 1: Profit eﬀects of a national merger when a = 1 and w = c = 1
4
.
Proposition 3 (i) πIm > π0 for all µ ∈ [0, 1]
(ii) πIm > πIo for all µ ∈ [0, 1]
(iii) π0 > πIo if µ > bµ := (20−b2)(1−b)b(a−c−w)12(2−b)(3b+2)c
An international merger is always profitable for the participants, even
if µ = 0. This is of course due to the wage eﬀect of such a merger. As
shown in the previous Section, the wage reduction is larger the less diﬀer-
entiated products are, which helps explain why this eﬀect is suﬃciently
large to make an international merger profitable for every degree of prod-
uct diﬀerentiation. Furthermore, it is always more profitable to take part
in an international merger, rather than being an outsider, implying that
the ‘merger paradox’ is not a feature of an international merger in our
model. Indeed, if there are additional non-labour cost synergies from a
merger (i.e., µ > 0) an international merger may actually be harmful for
outside firms, as indicated by part (iii) of the Proposition. We see thatbµ = 0 if b = 1, implying that µ > 0 is a suﬃcient condition for outside
firms to lose profits from the merger if products are homogeneous.
The profitability of a national merger, on the other hand, is not
easily characterised analytically. Instead, we illustrate the profit eﬀects
of such a merger in Figure 1, for some given parameter values. The
diﬀerent areas in the Figure are defined as follows
A :πNm < π0 < πNo ,
B :π0 < πNm < πNo ,
C :π0 < πNo < πNm,
D :πNo < π0 < πNm.
16
We observe the following general pattern: a higher degree of product
diﬀerentiation and larger non-labour cost savings increase the likelihood
of a national merger being profitable (B+C+D), a national merger being
more profitable for the participants than for outside firms (C+D), and
a national merger reducing the profits of outside firms (D). The eﬀect of
non-labour cost savings from the merger is obvious. In the absence of
such cost savings, a national merger can still be profitable, provided that
the benefit of output coordination outweighs the wage increase following
such a merger. This is the case if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated,
which reduces the possibility of outsiders to free-ride on the merger.
5 Equilibrium market structure
We now turn to the equilibrium solution of the full game. A comparison
of the relevant profit expressions along the line of the solution procedure
sketched in Section 2.1 yields the following unambiguous result:
Proposition 4 The equilibrium market structure is two international
mergers for all parameter configurations.
Proof. We can show thatMII dominates all other market structures,
making it the unique equilibriummarket structure. Due to the symmetry
of the model, the dominance relations are determined by the following
conditions: MII dom MI if πIIm > πIo; MII dom M0 if πIIm > π0; MII dom
MNN if πIIm > πNNm ; MII dom MN if 2πIIm > πNNm +πNNo . The fulfillment
of these conditions is confirmed by straightforward algebra.
The intuition behind this result is naturally related to the wage ef-
fects of diﬀerent types of merger. Regarding the firms’ choice between
merging domestically or internationally, the market structure with two
international mergers dominates any market structure involving national
merger(s) if the former structure yields higher industry profits. This is,
in turn, dependent on how diﬀerent types of merger aﬀects the power
struggle between employers and workers. As we have shown in Section 3,
the eﬀective market power of trade unions is lower when firms merge in-
ternationally rather than domestically, which implies that a larger share
of the oligopoly rents is extracted by the firms in the former case.
Furthermore, for two international mergers to constitute an equilib-
rium market structure, the second merger must be privately profitable.
For low degrees of product diﬀerentiation, and in the eventual absence
of non-labour cost savings, this requires that the merger produces a
suﬃcient saving of wage costs. Since the trade unions will keep wages
relatively high in firms that are not internationally merged, there is al-
ways a suﬃcient potential for wage cost savings to make the second
international merger profitable for the participants.
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Obviously, due to the symmetry of the model, there are multiple equi-
libria, where the equilibriummarket structure is the set of two ownership
structures, both in which all owners merge internationally.
6 Global welfare
In regard to social welfare the analysis of the previous Section immedi-
ately raises the following question: will the ‘merger market forces’ lead
to socially desirable market structures? The answer to this question is
obviously important in determining the optimal framing of merger policy
in open economies, and in this Section we will highlight the implications
for global welfare — defined as the sum of consumers’ surplus, profits
and union utility — by making a social ranking of market structures.
Formally, global welfare in market structure Mk is given by
Wk = Uk −
4X
i=1
pki q
k
i +
4X
i=1
πki + V kA + V kB (11)
which simplifies to
Wk = Uk − [w + c(1−Diµ)]
4X
i=1
nki . (12)
Note that the welfare function weighs incomes of diﬀerent groups
in society equally. Wage payments and payments for goods therefore
appear as mere transfers of money that do not influence social welfare.
In consequence, welfare is decided solely by the value to consumers of the
goods produced less the opportunity costs of the labour and non-labour
resources used as inputs.
A comparison of global welfare in the diﬀerent market structures
yields the following key results:
Proposition 5 (i)MII is always socially preferable to any market struc-
ture involving national merger(s),
(ii) MII is the socially optimal market structure for all µ ∈ [0, 1] if
b > 0.56.
A proof, which requires some tedious algebra, is given in Appendix
B.
The first part of the Proposition implies that national mergers are
never socially optimal, from a viewpoint of global welfare. Such mergers
may increase global welfare, if non-labour cost synergies are suﬃciently
large, but market structures involving national merger(s) are always so-
cially dominated by the market structure with two international mergers.
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Figure 2: Socially optimal market structures for a = 1 and w = c = 1
4
.
Furthermore, two international mergers is the socially optimal market
structure if the degree of product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low, re-
gardless of the size of non-labour cost savings. A comparison between
Proposition 4 and 5 reveals a perfect correspondence between private and
social merger incentives for this case of relatively homogeneous goods.
The reason why international mergers can be socially optimal here
— even if µ = 0 — while they would not be in a model with exogenous
production costs, is that the power struggle between labour and capital
not only lower wages, but consumer prices may fall as a result. Since
national mergers have no such eﬀect on wages, rather the opposite, they
will never be socially preferable unless non-labour cost synergies are suf-
ficiently large. But even if these synergies are large enough to make
national mergers welfare improving, the eﬃciency gains from interna-
tional mergers are always larger, due to the union wage eﬀects.
An illustration of how the socially optimal market structure depends
on the key parameters b and µ is given in Figure 2 for a specific numerical
example. We see thatMII is the socially optimal market structure if the
degree of product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low (b > 0.56) or non-
labour merger synergies are suﬃciently large. In this specific example,
non-labour cost savings of more than 2 percent are suﬃcient to make
MII the optimal structure for every degree of product diﬀerentiation.
On the other hand, if the exogenous merger synergy is non-existent,
or very low, the socially optimal market structure is determined by the
degree of product diﬀerentiation. For intermediate levels of diﬀerentia-
tion, one international merger is socially preferable, whereas any merger
reduces global welfare if products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. The
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intuition is relatively straightforward: if µ = 0, mergers can improve
welfare only if they lead to reduced consumer prices, at least for some
brands. We know that only cross-border mergers can lead to such price
reductions, provided that wages are suﬃciently reduced as a result of
the merger(s). More specifically, the wage reductions must outweigh the
eﬀect of increased market concentration. Since the strength of the wage
eﬀect is decreasing in the degree of product diﬀerentiation, the mar-
ket concentration eﬀect is more likely to dominate the wage eﬀect the
more diﬀerentiated products are. Consequently, MI andM0 are socially
optimal for intermediate and low levels of diﬀerentiation, respectively.
7 Domestic welfare
The evaluation of diﬀerent market structures from a perspective of do-
mestic welfare may diﬀer significantly from evaluations with respect to
global welfare.30 In order to analyse the impact of mergers on domestic
welfare we make a couple of additional assumptions. First, we assume
that domestic consumers’ surplus constitutes a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of
global consumers’ surplus. Second, we assume that profits are divided
evenly between the owners taking part in a merger.31 Domestic welfare
in market structure Mk is then given by
WAk =
2X
i=1
πki + V kA + α
Ã
U −
4X
i=1
pki q
k
i
!
, (13)
Consider first the case of no exogenous cost savings from a merger.
Figure 3 depicts the pattern of the most preferred market structure in
the (b,α) plane when µ = 0.32 By comparing Figures 2 and 3, we see
that there is no conflict between domestic and global interests, from a
welfare point of view, as long as a suﬃciently high share of consumers
reside in the domestic country. The domestically optimal market struc-
ture is then one (two) international merger(s) for intermediate (high)
levels of product diﬀerentiation, and no merger otherwise, precisely as
a concern for global welfare would dictate. However, if α is suﬃciently
30Konrad and Lommerud (2001) warn that any preferential treatment of domestic
firms can be manipulated in the following sense: foreign owners may sell their assets
to domestic owners who then receive favourable treatment, but this only makes the
domestic buyers willing to pay a higher price for the assets in question, so the real
beneficiaries are the original foreign owners.
31With the geographic distribution of owners fixed, α of course becomes a measure
of the extent to which consumers relative to capital owners reside in the home country.
32When µ = 0, the parameters a, w and c can be factored out of the welfare
expressions, implying that the social ranking of diﬀerent market structures does not
depend on the numerical values of these parameters.
20
Figure 3: Domestically most preferred market structure when µ = 0.
low the domestically most preferred market structure is a foreign na-
tional merger, which harms consumers, but benefits domestic firms and
workers through higher wages, employment and profits.
An equivalent illustration for the case of a 5 percent non-labour
merger synergy is provided in Figure 4 for a specific numerical example.
Again, comparing with Figure 2 — which is based on the same numerical
example — we see that the presence of non-labour cost savings increase
the correspondence between domestic and global interests. From both
perspectives, the optimal market structure is two international mergers,
unless a relatively low share of consumers reside in the domestic country
and products are suﬃciently close substitutes in demand. In the latter
case, a foreign national merger is still the most preferred structure, from
a domestic point of view.
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate a potential conflict, though, when it comes
to coordination of domestic antitrust policies across diﬀerent countries,
particularly for the case of non-existent or very low non-labour merger
synergies. Assume that a large share of the consumers, say α = 0.8,
reside in country A, and consider the case of µ = 0. In this case, the
most preferred market structure for country A is one (two) international
merger(s) if the degree of product diﬀerentiation is intermediate (high),
and no merger otherwise. However, if 80 per cent of consumers live in
country A then at most 20 per cent of consumers in this market live in
country B, and this country would consequently prefer a foreign national
merger.
Finally, we want to highlight the eﬀect of a domestic merger on do-
mestic welfare. Under which circumstances will such a merger improve
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Figure 4: Domestically most preferred market structure when µ = 0.05,
a = 1 and w = c = 1
4
.
domestic welfare?
Proposition 6 A domestic merger is always detrimental to domestic
welfare unless µ is suﬃciently large.
The proof lies in a straightforward evaluation of WAN(d) − WA0 and
WANN −WAN(f).
Assume that there are no exogenous merger synergies, i.e., µ = 0.
In this case, the Proposition implies that if national competition policy
is governed by considerations for domestic welfare, as defined by (13),
the antitrust authorities should never allow a domestic merger. This
holds even if α = 0, which means that the proposed merger’s eﬀect on
consumers’ surplus is irrelevant for domestic welfare. Thus, even if a
domestic merger is profitable, the decrease in domestic union rents, due
to a loss of employment, more than outweighs the increase in profits.
Such a merger benefits domestic welfare only if non-labour cost savings
are suﬃciently large. Note also that it can be shown that even when
a domestic merger is welfare improving, it will still not be part of the
most preferred market structure from a domestic welfare viewpoint, in
line with figures 3 and 4.
For the case of µ = 0, this result mirrors the result in Brander and
Spencer (1985). They found that a government should pay a subsidy to
a domestic firm operating in a foreign Cournot market. The subsidy is
a commitment device which helps the firm to behave more aggressively
and shift profits to its own country. In our setting, a national merger
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results in higher wages, which is the opposite of paying a subsidy to
the firm. This implies that the Cournot firm operating in a foreign
market is committed to act less aggressively when it faces higher wages
after the merger, thereby reducing the combined sum of profits and
union rent. This result questions the idea that lax domestic merger
policy can substitute for strategic trade policy or other activist industrial
policies to build up national champions. The above reasoning tells us
that the non-intervention market structure outcome may not be the
domestic welfare optimal one. But if there is a problem, the problem
is too many international mergers, not that one would want domestic
mergers instead of international ones. Strict merger policy towards all
kinds of mergers should then be the choice, not lax merger policy only
for domestic mergers.
8 Non-cooperative merger formation
In the previous analysis we applied a cooperative merger formation
model first introduced in Horn and Persson (2001a). In many mar-
kets, though, merger formation resembles a non-cooperative game. For
example, firms merge as a result of an acquisition. In this Section we in-
troduce two simple versions of a non-cooperative acquisition game, and
compare our results with the ones reported in Section 5. In line with
the previous analysis, we restrict the attention to two-firm mergers, i.e.,
one firm acquiring only one other firm.
First, let us consider a sequential acquisition game, which is played
in two stages according to the following rules: at each stage, one firm
is given the role as an initial bidder.33 It decides to bid or not on a
target firm of its own choice. If it bids, then other firms not already
involved in an acquisition can also bid for the target. We assign firm 1
the role of initial bidder at stage 1. It decides whether or not to make
a bid, and chooses the target firm if it decides to bid. Furthermore,
firm 2 is the initial bidder at stage 2 if it was not the target at stage 1.
Otherwise, firm 3 is the initial bidder at stage 2. If a firm is indiﬀerent
between bidding and not bidding, we assume that the firm bids. The
game is illustrated in Figure 5, where we have specified the profits for
the bidder and the target, respectively. Note that when there are two
acquisitions, the profits of the stage 2 bidder and target are listed before
the corresponding stage 1 profits.
In Appendix C we show that the outcome of such an acquisition game
33Both in this game and the subsequent simultaneous game one could imagine an
initial stage where there were a lottery of which role each firm should have. This
would preserve the symmetry of the model, and all firms would have the same ex
ante profit.
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Figure 5: Profits of the bidder and the target
is two international acquisitions, which is identical to the outcome of the
cooperative merger model. This should not be a surprise. As shown in
the previous Sections, the firms that merge internationally will always
be better oﬀ, and it is always better to be an insider than an outsider.
Note, though, that in this particular setting the target firm at stage
1 and the bidder firm at stage 2 are the ones with the highest profit.
The latter firm gains from no competition from other bidders, while the
target firm at stage 1 gains from competition for being an acquiring firm
at stage 1 and thereby avoiding being a target at stage 2. However, the
two remaining firms (the bidder at stage 1 and the target at stage 2) are
also better oﬀ compared with the case if no acquisitions at all.
Second, let us also consider a simultaneous acquisition game. To
simplify, we assign the roles as bidders to firms 1 and 3. They decide
simultaneously whether or not to make bids for the two target firms.
Each of the acquiring firms can bid on both target firms (2 and 4), but
one bidder can only acquire one firm. As we show in Appendix C, the
equilibrium outcome of this game is also two international acquisitions.
Each target firm receives the profits it could have earned by turning
down the oﬀer, while the two bidding firms capture the remaining profits
generated by two international acquisitions.
We summarise our result as follows:
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Proposition 7 Two international acquisitions is the equilibrium out-
come of the described non-cooperative acquisition games.
9 Some concluding remarks
In this paper we have explored how the presence of trade union power
can aﬀect the pattern of mergers in an international oligopoly. A core
idea is that a merger triggers wage changes. Our model can then be seen
as a merger model with endogenous costs. But in contrast to the received
literature, a merger may aﬀect costs for all firms in the industry.34 This
has important implications for merger policy. Farrell and Shapiro (1990)
argued that a suﬃcient criterion for a merger to improve welfare is that
it leads to lower product prices. They propose a simple criterion for
when a merger results in lower product prices.35 It specifies how large
the reduction in the merging firm’s marginal costs must be for consumer
prices to fall. If the merging firm lowers product prices, the non-merging
firm is expected to do the same. However, our results illustrate that such
a criterion can be misleading, because marginal costs change for the
non-merging firms as well. One cannot consider only the merging firm’s
pricing decision to tell whether consumers benefit or not. For example,
with an international merger one could have that the output pricw of
the merging firm goes up while the output price of the non-merging firm
goes down. By using the Farrell and Shapiro criterion for that particular
example one would only concentrate on the merged firm’s price increase
and forget the outside firm’s price cut. In fact, the output price of a
non-merging firm may change even if the output price of the merging
firm does not.
According to our predictions, a national merger is expected to lead
to higher wages, while an international merger is expected to have the
opposite eﬀect on wages, at least if non-labour cost savings are not too
large. It is an empirical question whether this in fact happens. Unfor-
tunately, there are no empirical studies that tests for the wage eﬀect of
an international versus a national merger. One recent study, though,
can shed some light on the issue. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) test em-
pirically how mergers aﬀect employment. They found that in the UK a
domestic merger reduces employment by much more than cross border
deals made by UK acquiring firms. This is consistent with a prediction
34The first study that introduced internal cost savings following a merger was Perry
and Porter (1985). A merger resulted in an internal change in how firms operated
their crucial assets. It triggered lower marginal costs, but only for the merged firm.
35Farrell and Shapiro (1990) consider only an industry with identical products.
Werden (1996) extends their criterion to the case of an industry with diﬀerentiated
products.
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saying that national mergers are more wage-increasing than cross-border
mergers. However, one should be careful with the interpretation of their
results since their study is not tailored to test the predictions from our
theory.36 This calls for more detailed empirical studies. The structure
of the labour market should be taken into account when testing directly
for wage eﬀects following diﬀerent kinds of mergers. This is an issue for
future research.
A Equilibrium expressions
A.1 No merger (M0)
Equilibrium employment, wages and profits for a firm in M0 are given
by
n0 =
(2 + b) (a− c− w)
4 (2 + 3b)
, (A.1)
w0 =
1
4
[(2− b) (a− c) + w (2 + b)] , (A.2)
π0 = (a− c− w)
2 (b+ 2)2
16 (3b+ 2)2
. (A.3)
A.2 One national merger (MN)
Equilibrium employment, wages and profits for merger participants and
outsiders in MN are given by
nNm =
(2 + b) [(2 + 2b− b2) (a− c− w) + µc (2 + 3b)]
2 (2 + 3b− b2) (4 + 6b+ b2) , (A.4)
nNo =
(1 + b) [(4 + 4b− b2) (a− c− w)− µcb (2 + b)]
2 (2 + 3b− b2) (4 + 6b+ b2) , (A.5)
wNm =
(2 + 2b− b2) (a− c) + 2w (1 + b)2 + µc (2 + 3b)
4 + 6b+ b2
, (A.6)
wNo =
(4 + 4b− b2) (a− c) + w (2 + b) (2 + 3b)− µcb (2 + b)
2 (4 + 6b+ b2)
, (A.7)
36There are some potential problems relating their study to our predictions. First,
there are no direct link between employment eﬀects and wage changes. For example,
a cutback in employment can be a pure synergy eﬀect and will not necessarily mirror
a wage change. Second, in the empirical study there are no data to control for the
structure of the labour market. Third, when comparing national and international
mergers they do not distinguish between related and unrelated mergers. Only in the
former we expect that market power in the product market matters. Note also that
for Continental Europe they found only minor diﬀerences in the employment eﬀect
of national and international mergers.
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πNm =
(2 + b)2 (1 + b) [(2 + 2b− b2) (a− c− w) + µc (2 + 3b)]2
4 (4 + 6b+ b2)2 (2 + 3b− b2)2
, (A.8)
πNo =
(b+ 1)2 [(4 + 4b− b2) (a− c− w)− µcb (b+ 2)]2
4 (4 + 6b+ b2)2 (2 + 3b− b2)2
, (A.9)
A.3 Two national mergers (MNN)
Equilibrium employment, wages and profits for a merger participant in
MNN are given by
nNNm =
(1 + b) [a− w − c (1− µ)]
2 (1 + 2b) (2 + b)
, (A.10)
wNNm =
a+ w (1 + b)− c (1− µ)
2 + b
, (A.11)
πNNm =
[a− w − c (1− µ)]2 (1 + b)3
4 (2 + b)2 (1 + 2b)2
. (A.12)
A.4 One international merger (MI)
Equilibrium employment, wages and profits for merger participants and
outsiders in MI are given by
nIm =
(2− b) [(8− b2) (a− c− w) + cµ (8 + 6b− b2)]
2 (2 + 3b− b2) (16− 12b+ b2) , (A.13)
nIo =
(4− b) (2− b2) (a− c− w)− µc3b (2− b)
(2 + 3b− b2) (16− 12b+ b2) , (A.14)
wIm =
2 (1− b) [2 (2− b) (a− c) + µc (4− b)] + w (8− 3b2)
16− 12b+ b2 , (A.15)
wIo =
(2− b) [(4− 3b) (a− c)− µcb] + 2w (4− b− b2)
16− 12b+ b2 , (A.16)
πIm =
(2− b)2 (1 + b) [(8− b2) (a− c− w) + µc (8 + 6b− b2)]2
4 (16− 12b+ b2)2 (2 + 3b− b2)2
, (A.17)
πIo =
[(4− b) (2− b2) (a− c− w)− 3µcb (2− b)]2
(16− 12b+ b2)2 (2 + 3b− b2)2
. (A.18)
27
A.5 Two international mergers (MII)
Equilibrium employment, wages and profits for a merger participant in
MII are given by
nIIm =
(2 + b) [a− w − c (1− µ)]
2 (1 + 2b) (4− b) , (A.19)
wIIm =
2 (1− b) [a− c (1− µ)] + w (2 + b)
4− b , (A.20)
πIIm =
[a− w − c (1− µ)]2 (2 + b)2 (1 + b)
4 (4− b)2 (1 + 2b)2
. (A.21)
B Proof of Proposition 5
(i) Using the equilibrium expressions reported in Appendix A, and the
definition of global welfare given in (11), we can derive
WII −WNN =
[a− w − c (1− µ)]2 b (24 + 41b− 9b2 − 8b3)
2 (4− b)2 (2 + b)2 (1 + 2b)
> 0 (B.1)
and
WII −WN =
b2Ω (a− c− w)2 + µc (2 + b) (2 (a− c− w)Φ+ µcΨ)
4 (2 + 3b− b2)2 (6b+ b2 + 4)2 (4− b)2 (1 + 2b)2
,
(B.2)
where
Φ=896 + 6912b+ 20 872b2 + 29 644b3 + 15 954b4
−5583b5 − 8408b6 − 222b7 + 1409b8 − 110b9 − 26b10,
Ψ=896 + 6272b+ 16 104b2 + 16 356b3 − 52b4
−10 954b5 − 4642b6 + 1407b7 + 751b8 − 98b9 − 18b10,
Ω=1760 + 10 736b+ 22 876b2 + 16 356b3 − 6147b4
−10 673b5 + 26b6 + 1880b7 − 190b8 − 30b9.
It is easily verified that Φ, Ψ and Ω are all non-negative for b ∈ (0, 1),
which implies that WII −WN > 0.
(ii) It remains to verify that WII > max {WI ,W0} for b > 0.56. We
have that
WII −WI =
bΛ (a− c− w)2 + µc (2z (a− c− w) + µcΥ)
4 (2 + 3b− b2)2 (16− 12b+ b2)2 (4− b)2 (1 + 2b)2
, (B.3)
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where
Λ=−6144 + 2304b+ 35 328b2 − 23 888b3 − 47 312b4 + 55 140b5
−7192b6 − 13 101b7 + 6763b8 − 1238b9 + 78b10,
Υ=28 672 + 73 728b− 79 616b2 − 224 640b3 + 127 808b4 + 174 032b5
−147 412b6 + 24 380b7 + 6459b8 − 2297b9 + 186b10 − 2b11,
z=28 672 + 100 352b+ 20 480b2 − 192 640b3 − 42 896b4 + 160 496b5
−21 772b6 − 42 298b7 + 19 153b8 − 2581b9 + 2b10 + 14b11.
The denominator in (B.3) is obviously positive for b ∈ (0, 1), so the sign
of (WII −WI) is determined by the sign of the numerator. Within the
relevant range of b it is easily verified that Λ > 0 if b > 0.56, Υ > 0
if b < 0.78, and z > 0 for b ∈ (0, 1). The sign of the second term
in the numerator of (B.3) can be determined by noting that both z
and Υ reach their minimal value on [0, 1] at b = 1. It follows that if
(2z (a− c− w) + µcΥ) > 0 for b = 1, then (2z (a− c− w) + µcΥ) >
0 for b ∈ (0, 1). Setting b = 1, 2z (a− c− w) + 2µcΥ reduces to
18 (2998 (a− c− w)− 1039cµ), which is positive for c < 1
2
(a− w). It
follows that WII − WI > 0 for µ ∈ [0, 1] if Λ > 0, which is true for
b > 0.56.
Finally, we have that
WII−W0 =
(2 + b)
£
(2b− 1)Γ (a− c− w)2 + 4µcΘ (2 (a− c− w) + µc)
¤
8 (4− b)2 (2b+ 1)2 (3b+ 2)2
,
(B.4)
where
Γ = b
¡
48 + 126b+ 25b2 − 73b3 + 6b4
¢
> 0,
Θ =
¡
14 + 21b− 11b2
¢
(3b+ 2)2 > 0.
We see that WII −W0 > 0 for µ ∈ [0, 1] if b > 12 . ¥
C Proof of Proposition 7
We solve the game by backward induction.
C.1 A sequential acquisition game
C.1.1 Stage 2:
(1) No bid at stage 1
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Firm 2 is the designated bidder. If it does not bid, there will be no
acquisitions, and profits are π0 for all firms. If firm 2 chooses to bid on
another firm, the other domestic firm (firm 1) or one of the foreign firms
(3 or 4) will be the target.
First, let us assume that firm 2 bids on firm 1. If firm 2 acquires
firm 1, total profits for the two firms would be 2πNm. However, the two
foreign firms can also bid. If one of them wins, total profits for those
two firms will be 2πIm. Since 2πIm > 2π0, firm 1 will accept a bid of
π0 + ε from either of the foreign firms (3 or 4). But such a bid is not
an equilibrium, since the other foreign firm will have an incentive to bid
higher. In fact, a bidding competition between the two foreign firms
would result in a bid of B = 2πIm − πIo, which is the reservation bid for
each of the foreign firms. The initial bidder will not find it profitable to
match such a bid. It knows that if it does not win, it earns πIo, while if it
wins it earns 2πNm−B. Its reservation bid would then be B = 2πNm−πIo.
Since 2πIm > 2πNm, we will observe an international rather than a national
acquisition.
Second, let us assume that firm 2 decides to bid on firm 3, which is
a firm in the foreign country. From the above discussion we see that it
can succeed with such an acquisition if it bids B = 2πIm − πIo, making a
profit of πIo. Since πIo > π0, this implies that making a bid would make
firm 2 is strictly better oﬀ, and there will be an international acquisition
in equilibrium.
(2) A national acquisition at stage 1
Firm 1 acquires firm 2 at stage 1, and there is no longer possible
with an international acquisition. At stage 2, there will either be no
acquisition, or a national acquisition. If firm 3 decides not to bid, there
will be no acquisition, and its profit is equal to πNo . On the other hand,
if firm 3 wants to acquire firm 4, it has to bid B ≥ πNo , which are the
profits of the target firm in case of no acquisition. The acquiring firm will
then earn 2πNNm − πNo . Since 2πNNm − πNo > πNo only for some parameter
values, the outcome is generally ambiguous.
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(3) An international acquisition at stage 1
If firm 2 decides not to bid, then there will be no acquisition. In such
a case its profit is equal to πIo. On the other hand, if firm 2 wants to
acquire the available (foreign) target, it has to bid B ≥ πIo, making a
profit of 2πIIm − πIo. Since 2πIIm − πIo > πIo for all parameter values, there
will be an international acquisition in equilibrium.
C.1.2 Stage 1
(1) No bid at stage 1
We know from the above analysis that if no acquisition occurs at
stage 1, there will be an international acquisition at stage 2. It implies
that firm 2 acquires either firm 3 or 4, and firm 1 is the outsider, making
a profit of πIo.
(2) A bid at stage 1
The bidding firm can either bid on a national or an international firm
at stage 1. We will discuss each of those alternatives. To simplify the
presentation, let us assume that if a national acquisition occurs at stage
1, there will be a second national acquisition at stage 2. It can easily
be shown that our conclusion will not change if we assumed that there
would be no second national acquisition.
If firm 1 bids on firm 2, then firm 4 will be the one of the two
remaining firms with the lowest profits if firm 1 succeeds, earning πNo .
Its reservation bid for firm 2 at the first stage of the game will then be
B = 2πIIm − πNo . Firm 1 can only succeed if it matches such a bid. If so,
it earns 2πNNm − (2πIIm − πNo ). Similarly, if firm 1 bids on firm 3, firm 4
will be the one of the remaining two firms with the lowest profits if firm
1 succeeds. If it succeeds, firm 4 earns πIo. Its reservation bid will then
be B = 2πIIm − πIo. Firm 1 can only succeed if it matches such a bid. If
so, it earns 2πIIm − (2πIIm − πIo) = πIo. By comparison we see that firm 1
will be better oﬀ with a bid on firm 3 rather than firm 2 if πIo > 2πNNm −
(2πIIm − πNo ). It can easily be verified that this is always true, which
implies that we will observe an international acquisition, if any, at stage
1 of the game.
Finally, we have to check whether there will be any acquisition at all
at stage 1. We see that firm 1’s profit is πIo, both in the case of no bid
and in the case of a bid on firm 3. Given that each firm by assumption
would bid if it is indiﬀerent, firm 1 will bid at stage 1 and make an
international acquisition.
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C.2 A simultaneous acquisition game
Our procedure is to show that a unilateral deviation is profitable in all
cases, except for the market structure with two international acquisi-
tions.
1. No acquisitions. Firm 1 will obviously find it profitable to bid π0
on the target firm 4 and earn 2πIm − π0 > 0.
2. One national acquisition. Assume that firm 1 bids on firm 2. It
must oﬀer firm 2 at least π0, and firm 1 can at most earn 2πNm−π0.
But then firm 3 will deviate. It can bid π0+ε, and earn 2πIm−π0−ε,
which is strictly better than πNo .
3. One international acquisition. As explained in the discussion of
stage 2 of the sequential game, the second initial bidder will find
it profitable to deviate by acquiring the second target.
4. Two national acquisitions. Each of the bidders can earn at most
2πNNm − πNo by bidding πNo , the outside option for the target firm.
However, a bidder can deviate by bidding πNo +ε for the other tar-
get firm, earning 2πIm−πNo − ε. Since 2πIm > 2πNNm , this deviation
is profitable if ε is suﬃciently close to zero
5. Two international acquisitions. Each of the bidders can earn at
most 2πIIm − πIo by bidding πIo. A bidder can deviate by bidding
πIo + ε for the other target firm, earning 2πNm − πIo − ε. Since
2πIIm > 2πNm, such a deviation is not profitable. Furthermore, since
2πIIm −πIo > πIo, it is not profitable to withdraw its own bid and be
an outsider firm in a market with one international acquisition. ¥
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